

**Secret**

NSA review completed



Thirty-eighth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from  
7 November through 13 November 1973)

*This report has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

**Secret**

25X1

14 November 1973

Copy No. **51**

DIA review(s)  
completed.

**Page Denied**

14 November 1973

**Thirty-Eighth Report****COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\***

(This report covers the week from  
7 November through 13 November 1973)

**The Key Points**

- Some 3,000 troops have been added to our estimate of infiltration south from North Vietnam during the past week. All are destined for southern Laos and adjacent areas.
- A North Vietnamese infantry regiment recently moved from northern GVN MR 3 into Quang Duc Province of southern MR 2 to help secure the Communist western supply corridor. The regiment participated in last week's heavy fighting in the area.
- Communist logistic activity was light throughout Indochina during the past week, but initial indications of ordnance shipments south from North Vietnam during this dry season were noted.
- New photography of North Vietnam leads the Department of Defense to conclude that most of the 130 tanks observed at the major armor training center northwest of Hanoi in [ ] have now left the area and may be headed south. The CIA believes this photography is not of sufficient quality to make such a determination.
- The new photography also provides further evidence that North Vietnam may be receiving military equipment from China or the Soviet Union.

\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

25X1

**Preface**

This is the thirty-eighth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

## Details

**Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies*****Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments***

1. Only one regular infiltration group was detected departing from North Vietnam for southern Laos or adjacent areas during the past week. Its detection, however, indicates that five other regular groups also are committed to infiltrating this area. A second regular infiltration group was observed moving toward its final destination in southern Laos. This latter group, however, was previously included in our estimate. Infiltration starts since 1 September now stand at 26,500, of which 85% have been sent to southern Laos and adjacent areas. In addition to regular infiltration, four small special-purpose groups were detected leaving North Vietnam en route to northern GVN MR 1. As shown in the following table, the total number of North Vietnamese troops who have infiltrated south since 1 September 1973 is slightly less than during the comparable period a year ago, but the proportion of the total traveling toward southern Laos is much higher.

**Comparative Starts of Troops  
from North Vietnam, by Destination  
1 September - 13 November**

	1972	1973
<b>Total</b>	<b>29,000</b>	<b>26,500</b>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	9,500	2,000
MR 5	4,500	2,000
B-3 Front	1,000	0
COSVN	7,000	0
Southern Laos/MR 559	7,000	22,500

2. COMINT received since 4 November 1973 indicates that the three battalions of the 205th NVA Infantry Regiment have moved from northern MR 3 to western Quang Duc Province of MR 2. The battalions apparently are operating with the 271st NVA Independent Infantry Regiment and were involved in the recent heavy fighting in Quang Duc Province reported in last week's report. Although the headquarters of the 205th Regiment was last firmly located in Binh Duong Province of MR 3 in March 1973, it had been tentatively identified near the Phuoc Long/Quang Duc Province border in late September. The Communists' decision to deploy major elements of the 205th Regiment into MR 2 appears to have been for the

purpose of securing the Communist western supply corridor through Quang Duc Province which could then allow for its further expansion into northern MR 3. The move, along with a similar shift by elements of the 271st Regiment in August/September, has now raised the Communist troop level in MR 2 by some 2,000 men at the expense of their force structure in MR 3. Map 515529 shows the current distribution of Communist, as well as South Vietnamese, combat forces by military region.

### *Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies*

3. Logistic activity throughout Indochina was light last week. The initial references to ordnance shipments from North Vietnam through Laos this dry season were detected, however, possibly signalling the start of the "large transportation effort" which was supposed to begin in mid-November (see last week's report). On 10 November an element of Binh Tram 26 which operates in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, reported that it had dispatched 30 tons of ammunition to the B-3 Front in South Vietnam through Laos, and was going to ship 40 tons of ammunition and 65 tons of explosives to COSVN. No dates for these shipments were reflected nor were these cargo shipments reflected in Laos.

4. The only other significant activity in North Vietnam occurred on 7 and 8 November when 150 tons of ammunition and explosives were transferred from Binh Tram 8 in the Vinh area to Binh Tram 26 located in southern Quang Binh Province. Small arms, mortar, and antiaircraft ammunition comprised most of the ordnance, and no ammunition for heavy field artillery pieces was detected.

5. In southern Laos, logistic units continued work on the road network and preparations for future activity (see Map 501958). The only noteworthy cargo shipment reflected in COMINT occurred on 5 November when a North Vietnamese unit was detected hauling 3,000 rounds of 75-mm recoilless rifle ammunition (about 60 tons) about 25 miles southeast of Savannakhet.

6. Within South Vietnam, less than 125 tons of materiel have been detected in COMINT since 1 October either moving across the DMZ or within northern South Vietnam. In August and early September an average of about 1,000 tons per day (mostly foodstuffs) was detected moving in this area. The sharp decline has resulted from the beginning of the rainy season in this area, which this year has brought unusually stormy weather. In addition to retarding vehicle activity, the heavy rains have flooded many storage areas, knocked out bridges, and disrupted communications.

## Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

25X1

## South Vietnam

## Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA <sup>1</sup>	RVNAF <sup>2</sup>
190,000	320,000


VC/NVA	RVNAF
92,000	89,000
325th	VNMC
324B	Airborne
320B	1st
304th	2nd
711th	3rd
2nd	Regional Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

VC/NVA	RVNAF
39,000	75,000
429th Sapper Command	25th
9th	18th
7th	5th
5th	Regional Forces

VC/NVA	RVNAF
25,000	88,000
1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	44th Special Tactical Zone
	Regional Forces



25X1

25X1

**Communist Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos*****South Vietnam***

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (7-13 November) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since 27 January Cease-fire		Total Since 15 June Cease-fire		Last Week (7-13 Nov)	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,875</b>	<b>24,761</b>	<b>1,506</b>	<b>10,806</b>	<b>36 (82)<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>481 (583)<sup>1</sup></b>
MR 1	1,443	5,172	418	1,813	9	74
MR 2	616	4,130	352	2,276	12	81
MR 3	590	4,399	188	1,823	3	84
MR 4	1,226	11,060	548	4,894	12	242

1. Figures in parenthesis denote totals of the previous week.

8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the charts following the Annex, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

***Laos***


9. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

**Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina*****New Photography on North Vietnam***

10. Photography of North Vietnam [ ] provided coverage of the Vinh Yen Armor Training Center northwest of Hanoi. There is a

25X1





significant difference of opinion between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA on the interpretation of this coverage. The DOD believes that the photography is of sufficiently good quality to determine that almost all of the approximately 130 tanks observed at this location in previous photography of late September are now absent. The DOD further believes that this armor may have been moved to North Vietnam's southern panhandle for possible deployment farther south during the upcoming dry season. Possibly related to future deployment of armor was a 3 October intercepted message from a North Vietnamese rear services regiment in southern Laos which revealed that the unit was preparing a parking area for "technical weapons," the Communists' term for AAA, armor, and artillery.

11. The CIA does not believe this photography is of sufficient quality to conclude that there has been any significant reduction in the number of tanks at Vinh Yen.

12. The photography [ ] also indicated that there are now 230 light antiaircraft pieces stored near the rail spur located east of Thai Nguyen, on one of the main rail lines between the Chinese border and Hanoi. There were about 180 light antiaircraft pieces at this location in early August 1973. This increase may represent new imports from China or the Soviet Union.

13. In North Vietnam, three Komar-class guided missile patrol boats [ ] were observed in [ ] aerial photography near the Ha Tou Naval Base east of the Port of Hon Gay. These craft and missile crates probably do not represent deliveries of military equipment to North Vietnam since the cease-fire.

## ANNEX

Infiltration of North Vietnamese Personnel  
to the South Since the Cease-Fire

1. The detection of Group 5095 with 529 troops near Vinh on 10 November, and the resultant inclusion of five undetected groups (5093, 5094, 5096, 5097, and 5098) which are believed also to have been committed to the south, increases our estimate of infiltration starts since 1 September 1973 by some 3,000 troops. Group 5067 also was detected in the southern portion of the Laotian Panhandle, but it was previously accounted for in our infiltration estimate. Besides regular infiltration, special-purpose Groups A493, A495, A496, and M496 with some 175 personnel were detected starting their journey from North Vietnam to Communist MR Tri-Thien-Hue.

2. Since the 15 June second cease-fire, more than 34,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated south, some 32,000 of whom have been combat troops and 2,000 of whom have been specialists. Since the 27 January agreement, more than 84,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including more than 76,000 combat troops and about 8,000 specialists. Some 59,000 of these personnel have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month, since 1 January 1973.


Number of Personnel Entering  
the Pipeline Destined for South Vietnam,  
Southern Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1973

	Total	Special-Purpose
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June	2,200	700
July	3,650	600
August	2,200	700
September	7,000	0
October	14,325	325
November 1-13	5,675	175



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



25X1

25X1

**Secret**



**Secret**